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The Return of Perennial Perspectives?
Why Transpersonal Psychology
Should Remain Open to Essentialism
Steve Taylor

Leeds Beckett University
Leeds, UK
In reply to Hartelius’s (2016) response to my paper “From Philosophy to Phenomenology: The
Argument for a ‘Soft’ Perennialism” (Taylor, 2016a), I provide arguments in support of my
model from contemporary scholars of mysticism, who advocate a move from a philosophicallybased perennialism to a phenomenologically-based essentialism. This discussion illustrates
that perennialist perspectives are far from outmoded. I discuss the metaphysical aspects of my
model, suggesting that there is no reason why transpersonal psychology should not address
metaphysical issues, as long as they are secondary to phenomenological issues, and as long
as they are based on evidence rather than wholly speculative. Attempts to exclude so-called
non-scientific phenomena from transpersonal psychology are based on invalid arguments,
including an outmoded concept of the importance of falsifiability. I argue that attempts to
explain the commonalities in accounts of spiritual or mystical experiences across and outside
traditions through radical diffusionism, contextualism, or neuroscientific reductionism are
inadequate. I note that these commonalities also feature in accounts of near-death experiences
and accounts of intense post-traumatic growth. I also highlight the importance of historical
cases of natural wakefulness in individuals with no familiarity with spiritual traditions. I
conclude with comments on the nature of recent debates in transpersonal psychology and
on the importance of pluralism.
Keywords: soft perennialism, essentialism, mystical experience, metaphysics,

contextualism, science

P

art of the purpose of this article is to respond to
the criticisms that Hartelius (2016) has made
of my soft perennialism model (as presented in
Taylor, 2016a). At the same time, the paper will explore
further aspects and ramifications of my model, and its
relationship to contemporary perspectives in the study
of mystical experiences. In the process, I aim to present
a case for an essentialist—rather than contextualist—
interpretation of expansive states of being as they occur
both within and outside spiritual traditions. In addition,
I would like to address wider issues relating to the field
of transpersonal psychology, including its relationship to
metaphysics and science.
I will begin with a brief summary of my model.
The basic aim of Taylor (2016a) was to argue that
transpersonal theorists such as Hartelius and Ferrer
(e.g., 2013) have been too ready to dismiss a perennialist
perspective that suggests that the transformational
processes and mystical experiences described across

spiritual traditions share certain essential features. In
Taylor (2016a) I highlighted seven common themes in
the depictions of the process of “spiritual awakening”
across various traditions. These are: (1) increasing
and intensifying awareness; (2) a movement beyond
separateness and towards connection and union; (3)
cultivating inner stillness and emptiness; (4) developing
increased inner stability, self-sufficiency, and equanimity;
(5) a movement towards increased empathy, compassion,
and altruism; (6) the relinquishing of personal agency;
and (7) a movement towards enhanced well-being.
My own research has suggested that when spiritual
awakening occurs outside the context of spiritual
traditions, the same themes and trends emerge. This
implies that there is a common psychological landscape
of expansive experience which is interpreted in different
ways across spiritual traditions, and outside them.
In view of this, I suggested, some form
of perennialism is necessary, and I put forward a
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 odel of soft perennialism that is different from
m
traditional perennialism in a number of significant
ways. For example, soft perennialism is primarily
phenomenological rather than philosophical; it does not
posit an end point to spiritual development; it does not
speak in terms of rigid, pre-given structures of spiritual
development (as does Wilber’s model, for example);
and it is not based on a concept of a transcendent other
but includes the experience of an immanent and allpervading spiritual force. In contemplative or mystical
traditions associated with monotheistic religions, this
all-pervading spiritual force may be conceptualized in
theistic terms, while in other systems it may become
conceptualized as fundamental spiritual principles such
as brahman, tao, or dharmakaya.
In Taylor (2016a) I advocated a more
phenomenological approach, focused on experiences that
occurred outside the context of spiritual traditions and
practices, suggesting that transpersonal psychology has
traditionally been too oriented around spiritual traditions
and practices (Taylor, 2016a). This form of perennialism
has some commonalities with Ferrer’s participatory
philosophy, as acknowledged by Ferrer (2017). (Indeed,
Ferrer has suggested the term participatory perennialism
as an alternative to soft perennialism.) In fact, one of my
initial motivations in formulating the model was to try
to establish some common ground between perennial
and participatory perspectives. 1
My model could equally be seen as a form of
essentialism. Some scholars have used perennialism and
essentialism interchangeably (for example, Hollenback,
1996; Dible, 2010), but others—such as Almond
(1988), Marshall (2005), and Rose (2016)—have seen
perennialism and essentialism as distinct. According to
this view, essentialism emphasizes the commonalities
amongst mystical or spiritual experiences and practices
in different traditions (as soft perennialism does) whereas
perennialism refers to the claim that there is a common
core of basic teachings across religious traditions, and so
relates more strongly to the philosophical and conceptual
frameworks of traditions. In other words, essentialism
is more experientially or phenomenologically oriented,
while perennialism is more philosophically oriented.
Thus, Rose (2016) has associated perennialism with
“religious doctrines and symbolism” and essentialism
with “contemplative experiences” (p. 4). While as
Marshall (2014) has put it, “mystical essentialists, unlike
mystical perennialists (the two are often confused, but it
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is important to make the distinction,) do not insist on a
common core of teachings across traditions" (p. 7).
In these terms, my model is certainly more akin
to essentialism than perennialism. In fact, in the original
paper I could have used the term essentialist phenomenology
rather than perennial phenomenology to emphasise the
shift from a focus on doctrine and teachings (as in the
perennial philosophy) to a focus on experience (as in an
essentialist phenomenology). Essentialism can be seen as
the evidential basis of perennialism, and it is the evidential
aspects that I wish to focus on.
In the original paper, I used the metaphor of a
psychological landscape that is viewed and interpreted
in different ways by people who explore different aspects
of it, and look at it from different perspectives. That
is, the experiential landscape of expansive states of
being can be interpreted in different ways according
to different cultural and philosophical perspectives—
and also according to different individual personality
traits or tendencies. The question of ontology is not so
significant—the important point is that these expansive
ranges are part of human beings’ collective and potential
psychological experience.
My analogy is very close to the one used by
James (1986), who described mystical experiences as
“windows through which the mind looks out upon a
more extensive and inclusive world. The difference of the
views seen from the different mystical windows need not
prevent us from entertaining this supposition” (p. 428).
James was clear that this “wider world of meanings”
contains a great deal of variety—in his words “a mixed
constitution like that of this world” (p. 428)—and hence
a great range of perspectives and interpretations.
Contemporary Perennial
and Essentialist Perspectives
ne of Hartelius’s criticisms was that my paper was
too reliant on a small number of sources whom I
chose because they supported my arguments. In this way,
he accused me of unscholarly practice, drawing parallels
with Wilber’s unscholarly practice of misusing sources
and Blackstone’s of using uncritical interpretation of
textual material (Hartelius, 2016). This is the "cherry
picking" argument that is often used when academics
or scientists use sources to justify a pre-formed theory.
I believe that Hartelius’s criticism has validity
in the sense that I was too reliant upon a small range of
classic or well-established sources of mystical scholarship
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(such as Underhill, 1911/1960; Spencer, 1963; Stace,
1964; Scharfstein, 1973; Happold, 1986; Forman, 1999).
So what I would like to do in this response is to broaden
my discussion to include some more contemporary
sources. These sources show that perennialism (or
essentialism) is far from an outmoded concept in the
contemporary study of contemplative traditions and
mystical experiences, and also that there has been a
general shift towards a more phenomenological approach
in the study of mystical experiences, along the same lines
as my suggestion of moving from a perennial philosophy
to a perennial (or essentialist) phenomenology. I do not
intend to suggest that perennialism is now the consensus
view, but simply to show that perennial perspectives are
prevalent in contemporary scholarship, and that these
lend support to my soft perennialist outlook.
There are many contemporary scholars of
mysticism who have emphasized the commonalities
within contemplative traditions and suggested—in
a similar way to Taylor (2016a)—that this is due to a
shared domain of experience (not of teachings) which
underlies different conceptions and interpretations.
For example, Rose (2016) has highlighted a number
of “contemplative universals” within the meditative
experience of different traditions. Specifically comparing
what might be considered the meditative manuals of
Theravada Buddhism, Patañjali Yoga, and Catholic
mystical theology, he has found that the commonalities
are so striking that they point to a “religion-neutral
spiritual itinerary constituted by a repeatable and
invariant progression of experiential states” (Rose,
2016, p. 4). Rose has found that there are “virtually
identical sets of mystical experience that are induced by
the deepening concentration" in each of these traditions
even though they are associated with “distinct and
doctrinally irreconcilable religious systems” (p. 3).
Favoring a phenomenological approach (as I do,) he has
attempted to move away from a perennialism based on
“elusive common doctrines” (what I would refer to as
hard perennialism) towards a more phenomenologicallyoriented essentialism, where it is possible to find a
“universally plausible common ground” (p. 4). Rose has
found it possible to adopt what he has called apophatic
pluralism without advocating contextualism. He has
taken evidence for contemplative universals from modern
scientific fields such as neurology—for example, the fact
that brain scans show similar patterns of neurological
activity amongst contemplatives of different traditions.

Nevertheless, Studstill’s (2005) mystical pluralism—as
he has referred to his model—has a great deal of room
for variety, as its name suggests. Although Studstill
has allowed for "an unconditioned, unmediated
experience of the Real” (p. 26) he has also accepted
that most experiences are conceptually mediated to
some extent.. Thus, he has advocated a “moderate
form of constructivism,” at the same as holding that
“unmediated experience is possible” (p. 20).
Another contemporary scholar sympathetic
to essentialism is Marshall (2005, 2014), who has
emphasized both the commonalities and differences
across spiritual traditions. In his investigations into
the metaphysical implications of mystical experience,
Marshall has favored a form of essentialism that
he has termed mystical aspectism whilst recognizing
contributions from context and biology to mystical
phenomenology. In Taylor (2016a), I noted that an allpervading spiritual force is frequently depicted as having
qualities of radiance, such as when, in the Upanishads
and the Bhagavad-Gita, brahman is compared to the
sun. Marshall (2014) has also highlighted this feature:
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Studstill (2005) has also argued for a great deal
of commonality amongst the transformative processes
experienced by mystics across a variety of traditions.
He has particularly highlighted the commonalities
between Tibetan Buddhist Dzogchen teachings and the
medieval German mysticism of Meister Eckhart, Suso,
and Tauler, showing how the superficially different
aspects of these traditions are reconciled within the
essential unity of mystical traditions. Adopting a
systems theory approach to mystical experience, he has
explained how different mystical practices “disrupt the
processes of mind that maintain ordinary, egocentric
experience and induce a structural transformation of
consciousness” (Studstill, 2005, p. 6). He has described
the transformation that ensues in a similar way to Taylor
(2016a), in terms expansion and enhancement:
The essential characteristic of this transformation
is an increasingly sensitized awareness/knowledge
of Reality that manifests as (among other things)
an enhanced sense of emotional well-being, an
expanded locus of concern engendering greater
compassion for others, an enhanced capacity to
creatively negotiate one’s environment, and a greater
capacity for aesthetic appreciation. (Studstill, 2005,
p. 7)

The language of light that is a common feature of
emanative metaphysics, expressive of the outflow
of creation from its source and of mystical return
to that source … is probably more than symbolism
based on universal familiarity with the life-giving
sun, for special experiences of luminosity are a
very common, cross-cultural feature of mystical
experience. (p. 6)
Marshall (2014) has been critical of the “radical
contextualists [who] asserted that mystical experiences
are thoroughly conditioned by their religious contexts”
(p. 10). He has suggested that their conclusions are not
based on the phenomenological evidence of clear-cut
mystical testimonies, but on “abstract mystical ideas and
metaphysics, for which experiential sources are often
unclear or not at all visible” (p. 10).
Quantitative Research
owever, some of the strongest contemporary
evidence for a perennialist or essentialist perspective
stems from Hood (1975) and the cross-traditional
studies using his psychometric “mysticism-scale”
(M-scale). For example, a study by Streib and Hood
(2013) found that spiritual but not religious individuals
shared fundamentally similar experiences without being
attached to any particular religion or tradition, suggesting
that there is an underlying experience which is expressed
through spirituality, irrespective of a person’s religious
orientation (if any). Similarly, a study by Chen, Qi,
Hood, and Watson (2011a) explored the phenomenology
of the mystical experiences of 139 Buddhist monks and
nuns, using thematic coding and statistical analysis.
Confirmatory factor analysis supported Hood’s thesis
that “the phenomenology of mystical experience reveals
a common experiential core that can be discerned across
religious and spiritual traditions” (p. 654). That is, the
experiences of these Buddhist practitioners corresponded
closely to previous findings with individuals associated
with other traditions. A study of the experiences of
Tibetan Buddhist monks (Chen, Hood, Yang, &
Watson, 2011b) had very similar findings.
As Hood (2006) stated, “psychometric and
empirical evidence for the common core thesis is
substantial and continues to accumulate” (p. 1). This
evidence suggests that the same core characteristics of
mystical experiences occur no matter what religious or
spiritual tradition a person is affiliated with, and even
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when they are not affiliated with any tradition. As stated
in my original paper (Taylor, 2016a), expansive states of
being often occur with many of the same characteristics
both within and without spiritual traditions.
Partly inspired by Hood’s M-Scale, I and my
co-researchers Kilrea and Bilodeau (St. Paul University,
Ottawa, Canada) recently developed a scale that attempts
to test for an ongoing state of wakefulness (rather than
temporary experiences, such as Hood’s), entitled the
“Inventory of Secular/Spiritual Wakefulness” (Kilrea &
Taylor, 2016; Taylor, 2017). Through two pilot studies,
and with the aid of several consultants with relevant
expertise, the study was rigorously tested for content
validity, construct validity, and internal consistency
reliability, until a final scale containing 28 items emerged,
with a high degree of reliability and validity. The items
of the scale related to a variety of characteristics that
previous research had associated with the construct of
wakefulness, including perceptual characteristics such as
intensified perception and increased presentness, affective
characteristics such as increased sense of connection
and reduced identification with thoughts and mental
constructs, conceptual characteristics such as decreased
sense of group identity and increased inner security, and
finally behavioral characteristics such as the relishing of
inactivity and reduced interest in materialism (Kilrea &
Taylor, 2016; Taylor, 2017).
The scale was tested further with a group of
291 individuals from the general population, and 30
individuals who belonged to a hypothetically awakened
group, most of whom were not associated with any
particular spiritual tradition. Scores of the awakening
group were significantly higher than those of the general
group, showing statistically significant differences
(Kilrea & Taylor, 2016; Taylor, 2017). This research is in
its initial stages, so limited conclusions should be drawn,
and there are potential issues of circularity, which further
applications of the scale may potentially clarify. (A paper
detailing the development and initial testing of the scale
is presently in preparation. Further testing of the scale is
also being conducted.)
A New Day for Perennialism?
his list of contemporary scholars of mysticism
who are sympathetic to forms of perennialism or
essentialism could easily be extended. For example,
Sarbacker (2005) has also advocated an anthropological
and phenomenological approach rather than an
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ontological or theological one. Brainard (2000), Saso
(2015), and de Castro (2015, 2017) have also advocated
perennialist or essentialist perspectives.
It appears that, to some extent at least, there is
a return to perennialist or essentialist perspectives. Rose
(2016) has actually spoken of a “new day for perennialism”
(p. 1) and the “recovery of mystical essentialism” (p. 4)
after the notion had become unfashionable with the
popularity of Katz’s (1978) “radical contextualism.” Rose
has described a “return to the nomothetic—universalising
and essentialising—explanatory approaches to the study
of religions and mystics” and a “new boldness in moving
beyond constructivism towards essentialism amongst
mystical scholars” (p. 4).
This is not to say that perennialism or essentialist
perspectives are now dominant. The debate between
contextualism and essentialism continues. There are also
approaches that see both perspectives as problematic. For
example, Taves (2009) has developed an attributionist
approach as an alternative to both contextualism and
essentialism. She has suggested that experiences only
become religious or mystical when they are deemed as
such; that is, when special or unusual experiences are
attributed with a religious meaning. Komarovski (2015)
has suggested that constructivist or essentialist models are
Eurocentric and incompatible with the schemas of Tibetan
Buddhism, and that the debate should shift to the processes
and techniques that induce the experiences, rather than the
experiences themselves. Ferrer’s (2002, 2017) participatory
philosophy could also be seen as an attempt to move
beyond both perennialism and contextualism.
However, it is important to be aware that
contemporary perennial perspectives have become more
nuanced and sophisticated, emphasizing similarities and
differences—as well as assimilating contemporary fields
and theories such as systems theory and neuroscience—
and including biological, contextualist, and pluralistic
elements. There is a general recognition that earlier
forms of perennialism (such as those espoused by
Huxley [1945] or Schuon [1984]) were too simplistic,
glossing over plurality in their zest to find unanimity.
Again, one of the most significant aspects of this in
relation to Taylor (2016a) is the movement away from
the philosophical aspects (that is, a focus on doctrines)
towards a more phenomenological approach (that is,
a focus on experience) in keeping with the distinction
between a perennial philosophy and a perennial (or
essentialist) phenomenology.
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In other words, the rejection of perennialism by
some contemporary transpersonal psychologists appears
not to take account of—and to be out of step with—
contemporary debates in studies of mysticism and religion.
The perennialism depicted and rejected by, for example,
Hartelius (2015) and Hartelius and Ferrer (2013) is in
many respects a proverbial straw man of unsophisticated
early perennialism, centered around Wilber’s simplistic
structuralist perennialism or the traditional perennialism
of Huxley (1945) and Schuon (1984). In the critique of the
perennial philosophy in Hartelius and Ferrer (2013), for
example, no reference is made to any of the contemporary
more nuanced and phenomenologically oriented forms of
perennialism I have outlined above.
In any case, Hartelius and Ferrer’s (2013)
statement that, “the more closely accounts from different
mystical traditions are compared, the more they can be
seen to differ” (p. 190) seems extremely dubious. This
may perhaps apply to doctrines and beliefs, but it is hard
to see how it could apply to accounts or experiences (that
is, in the most accurate use of these terms, it might be
true in a perennialist sense, but not in essentialist one).
Hartelius and Ferrer (2013) have apparently made the
same error that essentialists accused Katz (1978) of—that
is, of comparing teachings rather than actual accounts
(Forman, 1999; Marshall, 2005).
Alternative Explanations
for Commonalities
f course, it is possible to accept that commonalities
exist and attempt to explain them in other ways
besides perennialism or essentialism. However, radical
diffusionist explanations (that is, the attempt to explain
all commonalities in terms of diffusion, without
recognizing other possible contributions, including
experiential) appear highly implausible. If there was a
chain of influence in the way this argument suggests,
surely accounts of experiences would have altered
beyond recognition over centuries of dissipation (as in
the game of Telephone) rather than remaining similar.
(This is in addition to a lack of evidence of significant
cultural contact, as argued by Marshall [2014].) And of
course, when one considers that such experiences occur
not just in the context of spiritual traditions, but in a
secular context amongst individuals who do not have
any grounding in spiritual traditions (and who live in
cultures without overt expression of spirituality) then the
concept of diffusion makes no sense at all.
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In his response paper, Hartelius (2016) actually
contradicted the previously quoted assertion (that “the
more closely accounts from different mystical traditions
are compared, the more they can be seen to differ,”
[Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013, p. 190]) by acknowledging
that similarities exist, but suggesting that their existence
can be explained in terms of the biological and
psychological correspondences amongst human beings.
As he wrote, “humans share quite similar DNA and
physiology. An explanation that relies on neuroscience
and phenomenology rather than on belief in some sort
of pervasive consciousness that is claimed to be the
basis of all existence, seems both more parsimonious
and more credible” (p. 43). Hartelius illustrated this
with the example of falling in love. However, if mystical
experiences are rooted in neurology or DNA, then
one would surely expect them to be more common,
in the same way that the experience of falling in love
is common. But of course, mystical experiences occur
infrequently, and it appears that only a tiny minority
of human beings experience an expansive state of being
(equivalent to spiritual awakening) as their normal state.
Surveys of spiritual and mystical experiences have found
that between a third and a half of individuals have
had them, and in most cases just once (for example,
Greeley, 1975; Hay & Heald, 1987). What would be the
neurological or biological basis of an experience which
most people have apparently never had?
Another problematic aspect of the linking of
awakening experiences to neurology is that it appears
to be a form of what Marshall (2014) has described
as “neuroscientific reductionism,” the tendency to
explain mystical experiences in terms of “common
neurobiological and psychological mechanisms” (p. 11).
There are many arguments here, but I will highlight
three. Firstly, in a general sense, there is the difficulty
of explaining any conscious experience as causally
connected to neurological mechanisms. The problematic
nature of this has been highlighted by many scholars
(for example, Chalmers, 1996; Kelly et al., 2007; Tallis,
2011; Nagel, 2012). In the language of the philosophy of
consciousness, this relates to the so called hard problem
(highlighted by Chalmers, 1996) of explaining how the
soggy lump of matter of the brain can give rise to the
amazing richness and variety of subjective experience.
So, in specific relation to awakening experiences, how is
it possible to explain such rich and intense experiences
in terms of greater or lesser activity in certain parts
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of the brain, or in terms of the activities of certain
neurotransmitters or hormones? In McGinn’s (1989)
analogy, this would be as miraculous as turning water
into wine.
Secondly, neuroscience has yet to establish any
reliable or consistent correspondence between specific
mental states and specific patterns of neurological activity,
which one would expect if the latter produced the former.
As Kastrup (2014) has stated, “Empirical observations
reveal an inconsistent and even contradictory relationship
between subjective experience and measurable parameters
of neural processes” (p. 33). This is also evident from
the lack of a clear relationship between brain states and
psychological conditions such as depression or ADHD,
and the lack of evidence for a significant benefit of
drugs designed to increase the brain’s serotonin uptake
(or to change the activity of the neurotransmitters
supposedly associated with ADHD; Healy, 2015).
Finally, phenomena such as near-death experiences (when
subjective experience seems to continue when the brain
is clinically dead) and terminal lucidity (when people
with severe brain damage experience a return to normal
consciousness shortly before death) also argue against a
straightforward link between neurology and conscious
experience (Kelly et al., 2007).
Further Arguments in Favor of Essentialism
n Taylor (2016a), to support my argument that there
is an experiential landscape of more expansive and
intensified awareness (equivalent to different degrees
of wakefulness) that precedes interpretation and
conceptualization by different spiritual traditions, I
drew on my research into awakening experiences, and
ongoing states of wakefulness, suggesting that essentially
the same characteristics occurred as those highlighted by
spiritual traditions. Another important piece of evidence
here (not emphasized in my original article for reasons
of space) is the many historical examples of individuals
who experienced ongoing expansive states of being (or
wakefulness) without being associated with spiritual
traditions, or even having any real knowledge of spiritual
practices and paths. Many of these examples are discussed
in Taylor (2017), including the poets D. H. Lawrence,
William Wordsworth, and Walt Whitman, and figures
such as the nature writer Richard Jefferies and the idealist
and social activist Peace Pilgrim.2
Such examples provide very strong evidence
against the radical contextualist position. Katz (1978)
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has commented on how the mystic-to-be grows up in
an environment full of “images, concepts, symbols,
ideological values, and ritual behavior” (p. 33) with
mystical teachings appearing at a later stage. But this is
manifestly not true in the case of mystics—and many
of those who have temporary mystical experiences—who
grow up outside the context of religion and spirituality,
in secular cultures without overt knowledge or support
of spirituality.3
It is also worth noting that secular awakenings
and the similarities of cross-traditional experiences are
not the only arguments against contextualism. Three
other problematic issues—summarized in Marshall
(2005)—are (1) the disparity between experience and
content (that is, mystical experiences often diverge from
the contexts and concepts of the traditions they are
associated with); (2) difficulty of expression (that is, if
mystical experiences are constructs of the traditions they
are associated with, surely it should be easy to describe
them with reference to the concepts to these traditions—
but of course, the opposite is frequently the case); and
(3) the failure of contextualists to distinguish between
different levels of interpretation, or to take into account
evidence showing that perception is largely independent
of high level cognitions such as theories and beliefs, so
that as Marshall (2005) has put it, “the power of theories
and beliefs to condition perception has firm limits” (p.
187).
Given that strong commonalities appear to
exist (as in the common depictions of the process of
awakening suggested in Taylor, 2016a, and in the
transformational processes identified by Studstill, 2005,
or the contemplative universals identified by Rose, 2016),
I feel that the most valid way of explaining them is in
terms of a common landscape of expansive experience—
or “the more expansive and inclusive world” described by
James (1986, p. 428), or the common experiential core
of Hood’s (2006) hypothesis—that is explored, viewed,
and interpreted in different ways, by individuals who are
both part of and outside spiritual traditions.
To extend the landscape analogy, mystics and
teachers of various spiritual traditions are the explorers
of this psychological landscape. Because of their cultural
and individual psychological differences, they explore
it in different ways, following different routes, and they
experience and encounter different aspects of it. So when
they leave accounts or maps showing their journeys—as
spiritual teachings or accounts of their experiences—the
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maps have a great deal of variation, but also show strong
commonalities.
Let me point out again that in my view it is
not so important to consider whether this landscape
is ontologically real. It is perhaps enough to treat it in
psychological terms—that is, one should think in terms
of ranges of potential psychological human experience,
which appear to be accessible to all human beings, as
aspects of the human psyche which may not be part of
normal experience for most human beings, but which
are may be uncovered in certain circumstances.
Metaphysical Issues
his leads me to the topic of metaphysics. One of
the critical points raised by Hartelius is that, in the
original paper, I addressed metaphysical issues while
claiming not to be doing so. I agree that the metaphysical
issues were not addressed with a great deal of clarity in
the paper. In retrospect, I feel that I was more cagey
about metaphysics than I should have been. So let me
now try to express myself more clearly.
I did not intend to imply that the soft perennial
model does not make metaphysical claims. One of the
points I was trying to make was that it is perfectly valid
for transpersonal psychologists to make metaphysical
claims about the nature of reality, provided these are
not wholly speculative or abstract. A distinction can
be made between abstract or speculative metaphysics,
and phenomenological or experiential metaphysics.
Schopenhauer (2012) criticized Kant for creating a
conceptual metaphysics rather than a metaphysics
that was expressed in concepts—that is, for creating
a metaphysics that was too abstract and speculative.
According to Schopenhauer (2012), metaphysics
should be empirical rather than merely rational, built
on phenomenology rather than just on concepts. As
he wrote, “It is true that universal concepts should be
the material in which philosophy deposits and stores up
its knowledge but not the source from which it draws
its knowledge. … It is not, as Kant defines it, a science
from concepts but a science in concepts” (p. 41, italics in
original).
Another example might be a religious
metaphysical system that a person accepts through belief
rather than experience (for example, when a person
accepts the notion of God or heaven and hell through
cultural transmission without actually having experience
of them). I see Wilber’s perennialism as another example
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of a metaphysics that is speculative and conceptual. This is
the main issue I have with his model—that it is an overly
conceptual metaphysical structure, based on his own
interpretation of contemplative traditions, rather than
one based on research or phenomenological evidence.
Hartelius (2016) stated that “the claim that a
pervasive spirit-force constitutes the essence of reality is a
metaphysical assertion, whether or not Taylor intends it
to be so” (p. 43). I agree that this claim is metaphysical;
I also agree that it would be more accurately expressed as
saying that, in expansive states of being, an all-pervading
spiritual force may be a fundamental feature of human
beings’ experience of reality, rather than a feature of
reality itself. But my argument is that this is not an
abstract and speculative metaphysical claim but one
which is supported by some degree of phenomenological
evidence. It is not wholly conceptual, as Schopenhauer
complained of Kant, but to some degree evidence-based.
This evidence includes anthropological reports, spiritual
texts, poems, reports of spiritual experiences, and so
on. I accept that other researchers may interpret this
evidence in a different way, but have attempted to make
a case for my own perspective.
In other words, as stated in the original article,
I believe it is appropriate to consider metaphysical claims
and ideas as long as they are based on phenomenology
“rather than being based on abstract analyses of spiritual
traditions or on theoretical speculation” (Taylor, 2016a,
p. 32). Daniels (2005) has made a similar point, stating
that “if metaphysics is to mean anything at all, it must
be based on sound phenomenology” (p. 174).
Nevertheless, one of the points I tried to
put across in Taylor (2016a) is that transpersonal
psychology should be primarily phenomenological,
and only metaphysical in a secondary sense. (As noted
in the original paper, Daniels [2005] has also stated
this view.) So when I recommended that transpersonal
psychology should move “away from metaphysics and
theory towards a more phenomenological research-based
approach” (Taylor, 2016a, p. 36) I did not intend to
imply that transpersonal psychology should move away
from metaphysics altogether, only that this should not
be a major concern. As I wrote in the original paper,
“If there are any metaphysical speculations to be made,
they are secondary, deriving from this phenomenological
analysis” (Taylor, 2016a, p. 19).
For me as a researcher, metaphysics is not so
important. As noted above, it is enough to consider that
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the landscape of potentially expansive human experience
is a shared aspect of human psychology. One should
consider what this might imply about the nature of
reality—that is, the ontology it implies (Ferrer, 2002)—
but this should not be a paramount concern. This accords
with Husserl’s (1963) view that, in the phenomenological
examination of experience, the ontological existence of
things was not so significant. That was the concern for
natural scientists—for the phenomenologist, experience
was paramount.
Dispensing with Metaphysics?
n any case, how can it be possible to move away
from metaphysics entirely? How would it really
be possible for transpersonal psychology to dispense
with metaphysics, as Friedman (2013) has suggested?
Hartelius (2016) has stated that “It is probably not
possible to remove all metaphysical assumptions from
any context, including science” (p. 44), but this seems to
underplay the importance of metaphysical assumptions
in forming interpretations, particularly with regard to
science.
It is impossible not to operate within some kind
of metaphysical framework. Even if a theorist states that
he or she is dispensing with metaphysical issues, there is
still some form of metaphysical framework motivating
their attitude to these issues, including the decision
not to address them. This is an error often made by
materialist scientists, and that is also made by Friedman
(2013). Materialist scientists may believe that they are
observing reality objectively, by focusing on hard facts,
and disregarding any phenomena or idea that has not
been empirically proven or that cannot be tested. But
materialist science itself incorporates metaphysical
assumptions. As Ferrer (2014) has put it, “Scientific
naturalism is not only thoroughly metaphysical, but also
arguably shaped by economic interests perpetuating an
eco-pernicious, disenchanted worldview that imposes
methodological blinders on transpersonal researchers”
(p. 157). Scientific materialism is a belief system that
holds that matter is the primary reality, and that all
phenomena can be explained in terms of the interactions
of particles of matter, or as epiphenomena of materialist
interactions. The skeptical attitude of materialist
scientists to such fields as spirituality and psychic
phenomena is not an avoidance of metaphysics but the
result of a materialist metaphysical paradigm. As many
observers (for example, Habermas, 2008; Nagel, 2012)
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have suggested, scientific materialism has many of the
characteristics of religious dogmatism.
As Ferrer (2014) has pointed out, Friedman
(2013) has made the same error, believing that he is
endeavoring to make transpersonal psychology more
empirical by excluding “the transcendent” or “transconceptual”— which he has defined as "anything
that is supernatural and metaphysical” (p. 307). In
principle, this would mean eliminating the study of
psychic phenomena and nondual or transcendent states
of consciousness. But in reality this simply means
shifting transpersonal psychology into a different kind
of metaphysical paradigm—namely, that of scientific
materialism. As Ferrer has put it, “turning the field
into a modern scientific discipline effectively binds
transpersonal psychology to a naturalistic metaphysical
worldview that is hostile to most spiritual knowledge
claims” (p. 152).4
Hartelius (2016) has made a similar error of
conflating metaphysics with the unscientific by stating
that “a more common contemporary understanding
is that metaphysics refers to subjects that cannot be
examined scientifically” (p. 43). What exactly does
science mean in this context, and how can it be free of
metaphysical claims itself? Hartelius’s own notion of what
science is stems from his own underlying metaphysical
paradigm. It is impossible for any perspective to be
outside of metaphysics. Hartelius has rightly suggested
that researchers should be aware of their own underlying
metaphysical assumptions, but it is not clear whether he
has heeded this advice himself.
In an especially helpful article, Marshall (2014)
has suggested seven possible explanatory positions
in relation to mystical experience, which may be
associated with different metaphysical positions. These
are (1) mystical perennialism; (2) radical diffusionism;
(3) mystical essentialism (which is related to mystical
aspectism); (4) mystical mediationism; (5) radical
contextualism (as espoused by Garside [1972] and Katz
[1978]); (6) post-modern relativism; and finally (7)
neuroscientific reductionism. Marshall’s point is that
scholars usually adopt at least one (and possibly more
than one) of these explanatory paradigms, even if they
are unaware of doing so. As he has written, “It is far better
to bring metaphysics out into the open than let it operate
surreptitiously in the background” (p. 11).
So which paradigm—or paradigms—should
transpersonal psychology include? Rejecting all forms

of perennialism or essentialism, the metaphysics of
Hartelius and Friedman appear to be varied combinations
of diffusionism, contextualism, and post-modern
relativism, with hints of neuroscientific reductionism.
The distrust towards metaphysics of Friedman
and Hartelius is reminiscent of the philosophical field
of logical positivism, which held that only statements
descriptive of sense experience were meaningful.
Metaphysical statements were meaningless because they
could not be reduced to statements about sensation, and
so could not be verified via the senses. In this way, logical
positivists attempted to reduce philosophy to a narrow
discipline centered round logic and language. Is it really
possible that a similar reductive agenda can be applied
to transpersonal psychology? Should the field really try
to exclude metaphysical claims (although of course this
is actually impossible in any case) and nondual states?
If so, the question must be asked: At what point does
transpersonal psychology cease to be transpersonal? At
what point does one take the trans out of transpersonal?
At what point does the field cease to be transpersonal
and simply become equivalent to positive or cognitive
psychology?
In any case, such attempts to limit the range of
transpersonal psychology are actually based on a false
dichotomy between the scientific and unscientific. This
attitude is based on the view that such nonmaterial
phenomena as metaphysical ideas and nondual states
of consciousness are unscientific because they are
unfalsifiable. Hartelius (2016) has exemplified this
simplistic binary position by suggesting that Wilber’s
metaphysics is invalid because he “has made an
unfalsifiable claim about the ultimate nature of reality”
(p. 43). Hartelius has rejected the concept of nondual
consciousness because it is “an unfalsifiable assertion
about the foundational nature of reality—and as such
it is a metaphysical assertion” (p. 44). He has suggested
that phenomena are only validly scientific when they are
testable and falsifiable. Everything else is metaphysical
and therefore of questionable validity.
However, in the contemporary philosophy
of science, it is generally recognized that it is far too
simplistic to make a distinction between falsifiable science
and unfalsifiable metaphysics (and other unscientific
disciplines such as Marxism or psychoanalysis). As Kelly
(2015) has summarized, “philosophers of science now
generally reject Popper’s arguments for the universal
primacy of falsification over confirmation” (p. 499).
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Kelly has pointed out that the importance of falsification
in historical scientific practice has been massively overestimated, and that scientific theories generally cannot
be proved or disproved, but gain credence by gradually
accumulating evidence over time. Most scientific
advances are the result of confirmation of bold theories
rather than falsification (Chalmers, 1979; Kelly, 2015).
It is certainly debatable whether Popper's
falsification criterion can be applied to social sciences.
Metaphysical theories may be evaluated according to
other criteria, such as internal consistency, subsumptive
power, and attention to data. In other words, falsification
is certainly not the only quality by which metaphysics
should be evaluated. Metaphysical theories do not
become invalid simply because they cannot be falsified.
It is therefore impossible to draw a line between the
scientific and unscientific (Tauber, 2009; Ferrer, 2014).
So to return to the question: What metaphysical
paradigms should transpersonal psychology include?
Should the field accept a quasi-materialist framework,
some combination of contextualism and neuroscientific
reductionism, a Wilberian perennial-structuralist
framework, or Ferrer’s participatory model (depending
on whether this is seen as a metaphysical model
or not)?5 I would argue that it is valid to include a
phenomenologically (rather than philosophically)
oriented soft perennialist or essentialist model. Since
diffusionist, radical contextualist, and neuroscientific
explanations are inadequate, I believe this is the most
satisfactory way of explaining the commonalities of
expansive states of being both across religious traditions
and outside them (such as the common aspects in
depictions of awakening noted in Taylor [2016a], or
the similarities identified by Studstill [2005] and Rose
[2016]).
However, this does not mean I am suggesting
that this should be the only paradigm. It is surely
acceptable for transpersonal psychology to include a
variety of metaphysical perspectives. One of the virtues
of the soft perennialism described in Taylor (2016a)
is that it offers a great deal of room for variety and
plurality, as with Ferrer’s participatory philosophy. I
agree with Ferrer (2014), who has stated that, “the field
should not be defined or limited by its allegiance to any
single inquiry approach, epistemology, or metaphysical
worldview” (p. 153). (This relates to the issue of
inclusiveness, which I will address in the last section of
this paper.)
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Possible Research Bias
et me briefly address the third criticism Hartelius
(2016) made of my original paper (Taylor, 2016a):
I do not show enough awareness of how my own biases
and beliefs could influence my research findings.
Although I only included a very short summary of my
research in the original paper, I agree that I did not
emphasize this. It is impossible for any researcher to
be unaffected by their own biases and beliefs, and it
is important to introduce measures to provide greater
validation. In my own case, I am aware that my own
perspective is influenced by my own background of nontraditional spiritual experiences, and in particular, my
personal experiences of becoming aware of a spiritual
force apparently pervading phenomena, and space itself
(see note 2). Perhaps if I had a background in traditional
religion, or was more strongly associated with particular
contemplative traditions, then my perspective would be
different.
This is an issue I have become more aware of in
recent years, and have tried to mitigate. For example, in
a recent study of 90 awakening experiences (Taylor
& Egeto-Szabo, 2017) the reports were analyzed by
myself and another researcher (whose background
was in conventional psychology and who had little
knowledge of transpersonal psychology, or of my own
work) independently, for greater validation. I have also
recently completed a research project on ongoing states
of wakefulness originally triggered by bereavement, in
which the thematic analysis has been conducted by an
independent researcher (the same individual mentioned
above), to reduce possible bias. The latter study also
includes quantitative measures (including the Inventory
of Secular/Spiritual Wakefulness mentioned earlier—
which has itself of course undergone a rigorous process
of validation).
One of the points I tried to make in Taylor
(2016a) is that both ongoing states of wakefulness
and temporary awakening experiences have the
same fundamental characteristics when they occur
both within and outside the context of spiritual
traditions. These characteristics, I suggested, include
heightened awareness or intensified perception (or a
process of increasing and intensifying awareness), an
increased sense of connection (or a movement beyond
separateness towards connection and union), reduced
cognitive activity with less identification with thoughts
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(a process of cultivating inner stillness and emptiness),
and enhanced well-being (Taylor, 2016a).
Whilst acknowledging the likelihood that my
research findings were affected to some degree by my
intentions and biases, it is important to remember that
these findings are by no means just my own. In effect,
my findings replicate many others. There is a large
amount of research showing that both temporary and
ongoing experiences of expansive states of being can
occur outside a traditional spiritual context, with very
similar fundamental characteristics. This evidence is
particular strong in relation to temporary experiences,
as was seen above in relation to cross-traditional studies
using Hood’s M-Scale. Similar evidence has been found
amongst the thousands of experiences collected by
the Religious Experience Research Unit (based at the
University of Wales), the research of individuals such
as Greeley (1975), Robinson (1977), Hardy (1979),
Hay (1987), and Hoffman (1992), as well as the earlier
research of figures such as Johnson (1960) and Laski
(1961).
In terms of ongoing expansive states, it is
significant that my findings were very similar to those
of Miller and C'de Baca (2001), who interviewed more
than 50 individuals reporting a sudden and permanent
psychological transformation. Miller and C’de Baca
termed this transformation quantum change and described
it as “a vivid, surprising, benevolent, and enduring
personal transformation” (p. 4), which can be so sudden
that it “break[s] upon consciousness like a forceful wave”
(p. 39). Miller and C’de Baca identified two different
types of quantum change– the mystical and the insightful.
The characteristics of the former are very similar to the
characteristics of traditional mystical experiences, with
the difference that they became established as permanent
traits: a noetic quality, a sense of unity, transcendence
and awe, a deep sense of well-being, and a deeper sense of
spirituality (Miller & C'de Baca, 2001). Significantly, as
in my research, a strong association was found between
this transformation and intense psychological turmoil;
more than half of the incidences of quantum change
were related to intense unhappiness, trauma, or tragedy.
My findings were also very similar to studies of
the after effects of near-death experiences. Research has
repeatedly found that many of those who have near-death
experiences undergo a permanent transformation into a
more expansive state of being, including characteristics
such as intensified perception, an increased sense of

connection to nature, an increased capacity for love and
compassion, reduced interest in material wealth and
personal success, a heightened sense of meaning, a new
spiritual outlook, and a reduced fear of death (Moody,
1975; Grey, 1985; Fenwick & Fenwick, 1995; Sabom,
1998; Van Lommel, 2006; Sartori, 2015).
Both the research into the after-effects of neardeath experiences, and Miller and C’de Baca’s (2001)
research into quantum change, illustrate that a shift into
a more expansive state of being can occur in exceptional
circumstances, in reaction to intensely traumatic
events that appear to dissolve a person’s ordinary selfsystem. This seems to enable a new, higher-functioning
self-system to emerge, with a much more expansive
awareness in phenomenal, conceptual, subjective, and
intersubjective terms (Taylor, 2017). There is a sense of
moving beyond limitations into a more intense, deeper,
and wider reality—that is, into what I described as a
more expansive experiential landscape (Taylor, 2016a),
or the “wider world of meaning” identified by James
(1986). Significantly, both in near-death research and in
Miller and C’de Baca’s (2001) research, many individuals
have undergone this shift outside the context of spiritual
traditions, without any prior interest in spirituality or
any experience of spiritual practice.
Studies of post-traumatic growth provide similar
evidence. Typical characteristics of post-traumatic
growth include a greater sense of appreciation, a stronger
sense of connection to nature and other people, a stronger
sense of meaning and purpose, a more accepting attitude
to death, and a greater interest in spirituality (Cryder,
Kilmer, Tedeschi, & Calhoun, 2006; Stanton, Bower,
& Low, 2006). Particularly in its most intense form,
post-traumatic growth shares many commonalities with
a shift into a more expansive state of being, as described
in the above research. This similarity is reflected in my
use of the term post-traumatic transformation for cases
of sudden shifts into a more expansive state of being in
my research, when they occur in the context of intense
psychological turmoil (Taylor, 2012, 2013, 2016b).
In effect, the findings of Miller and C’de
Baca (2001), and research into the after-effects of neardeath experiences, and cases of post-traumatic growth,
add support to my argument that there is a common
landscape of expansive psychological experience which
can be explored outside the context of spiritual traditions.
In other words, they could be seen as offering further
support to the essentialist or soft perennial perspective.
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As noted above, I agree that this claim is
influenced by my own perspective and experiences.
Others may look at the same data and reach different
conclusions. Further research on expansive experiences
or states outside the context of spiritual traditions may
help to clarify matters.
The Nature of Scholarly Debate
inally, I would like to comment on the tone of
Hartelius’s response to my article (which was,
unusually, published in the same issue as my original
article). I found the tone of the article hostile and
adversarial—for example, when he wrote that the
“primary contribution [of my essay] is to illustrate that
its particular approach is wholly unworkable and shows
no future promise” (Hartelius, 2016, p. 42). There was
also the insinuation that I have misused my academic
credentials by popularizing ideas based on shoddy
scholarship. As he wrote,

F

It is unfortunate that Taylor's ideas were not vetted
more carefully before being disseminated as a
popular book. Those with advanced degrees, and the
credibility these degrees confer, have a responsibility
to educate their public readers carefully, rather than
using public forums to advance ideas that may be
appealing to a popular audience but lacking in the
soundness that might give them enduring value. (p.
46)
In actual fact, this hostile tone is familiar from
some previous discussions within the transpersonal
community. Anderson (2015) has recently commented
on the nature of such debates, and I think her points are
worth quoting at length:
In transpersonal psychology, there have been far too
many combative, even vitriolic, “debates” among
individuals historically identified with the field.
Controversy itself is fine and healthy for any field
but attack is not. Anyone who has been in the field
of transpersonal psychology for a decade or so is
aware of many long-standing controversies. Not
only do these hostilities divide the transpersonal
community, but professionals outside transpersonal
psychology have noticed that we do not always
“walk our talk.” That is, we do not always live up to
the spiritual values we promote and that duplicity
undermines our public credibility. (p. 165)
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I agree with Anderson that transpersonal psychology
needs to adopt a much more inclusive approach. Of
course, scholarly debate should be rigorous, but there
has been a tendency of some transpersonal psychologists
to aggressively smite down any views which disagree
with their own, which suggests an inability to accept a
plurality of different viewpoints. It is disappointing that
some transpersonal psychologists seem to be fighting
over territory, and disputing over their different visions
of the field. This is an issue that many of my students of
transpersonal psychology have picked up on, and which
is often (in my experience) remarked on at conferences,
usually with an air of concern and confusion. If there
is any discipline which should be pluralistic, it should
surely be transpersonal psychology. Even though I have
a very different perspective to Hartelius, I have respect
for his ongoing contributions to the field, including his
diligent editorship of this journal—and I hope that he
has some respect for my own contributions.
Conclusion
n this article, I have attempted to provide a wider
range of evidence for a perennialist or essentialist
perspective from more contemporary sources, making
it clear that this approach is far from outmoded, and
providing further evidence for my assertion that there
is a landscape of expansive psychological experiences
that precedes interpretation by spiritual traditions.
My advocacy of a more phenomenological approach
to perennialist perspectives appears to be mirrored
by approaches by some contemporary scholars of
mysticism. These approaches are more nuanced and
sophisticated, and more pluralistic and contextualist,
than earlier hard perennial approaches, and as such they
could be considered forms of soft perennialism. (Note
again that some scholars—such as Marshall (2005)
and Rose (2016)—have used the term essentialism to
refer to experiences and transformative practices and
outcomes, reserving the term perennialism in reference
to teachings or doctrines. In this sense, I am advocating
essentialism).
I have also tried to clarify the metaphysical
aspects of soft perennialism, at the same time as
highlighting flaws in Hartelius’s own attitude to
metaphysics. I believe that transpersonal psychology
should be open to essentialism, and at the same time
address metaphysical issues and make metaphysical
claims, as long as these are evidence-based and as long as
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they emerge from (and are secondary to) phenomenology.
The phenomenological evidence that I feel supports my
model—and a perennialist or essentialist perspective in
general—includes the commonalities of cross-traditional
reports of mystical experiences and of depictions of the
process of awakening, similarities with accounts of neardeath experiences and accounts of post-traumatic growth,
and examples of individuals who have experienced
expansive states (both temporarily and on an ongoing
basis) outside the context of spiritual traditions. At
the same time, I have argued that other attempts to
explain these commonalities and similarities—such as
radical diffusionism, contextualism, or neuroscientific
reductionism—are inadequate.
Additionally, the inadequacies (and the
contradictions) of a pseudo-empirical scientific attitude
(which is itself bound to a form of metaphysics) should
be acknowledged. It is short-sighted—and outmoded—
to decide that certain experiences or concepts should be
disregarded or regarded as invalid or suspect because
they are unfalsifiable or untestable. This would deprive
transpersonal psychology of some of its most interesting
and potentially important data. From this point of view,
it is perfectly acceptable for transpersonal psychology to
address metaphysical issues, paranormal phenomena,
and nondual states.
To move away from this reductionist agenda
would not only harmonize transpersonal psychology
more with recent developments in other fields, but also
ensure that the field remains as pluralistic as possible.
Although advocating an essentialist approach, I believe
there should be room for a wide variety of different
perspectives and methodologies, with an integrative
openness and pluralistic outlook which should remain,
as Lancaster (2013) has written, “the defining feature of
transpersonal psychology” (p. 225).
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Endnotes
1. Ferrer (2017) has recently written a critique of my
“soft perennialism” as an appendix to his book,
Participation and the Mystery. His evaluation is
generally positive and respectful—for example, he
has written that “I find much of value in S. Taylor’s
proposal even beyond its fundamental points of
convergence with the participatory approach”
(Ferrer, 2017, p. 264) and that “soft perennialism
should be regarded as an important advance in the
ongoing perennialist/participatory dialogue” (p.
272). However, Ferrer (2017) has also highlighted
three specific shortcomings of my approach in the
light of his participatory philosophy. These are
(1) intra-subjective reductionism, (2) privileging
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an “essential” spiritual force over metaphysical
depictions of that force (this creating a hierarchical
framework,) and (3) possibly falling prey to a form
of the “myth of the given.” These are salient points
that I will respond to at a later date.
2. Whitman is one of the best examples of a “natural
mystic.” His experience of the world was intensely
pantheistic, with a strong sense of a spiritual force
pervading both all phenomena and his own being.
Whitman was highlighted by Bucke (2017) as a case
of “cosmic consciousness,” and by Maslow (1994) as
an example of a “self-actualized” person. Although
influenced by Emerson and the transcendentalist
movement, Whitman’s form of mysticism was
highly idiosyncratic, and unrelated to any particular
spiritual tradition. He certainly never followed any
spiritual tradition, nor any conventional spiritual
practice. In his later years, Whitman did develop
some familiarity with Indian philosophy but
apparently not any deep or detailed knowledge.
When Henry David Thoreau met Whitman, he
remarked that Leaves of Grass was “wonderfully like
the orientals.” Thoreau asked Whitman if he had
read oriental works, and he replied, “No, tell me
about them” (in Cowley, 1973, p. 919).
Once Eastern spiritual texts became more
widely available, many observers noticed parallels
with Whitman’s work, and sought evidence that
he was influenced by them. However, as the
literary critic Cowley (1973) remarked, “What is
extraordinary about this Eastern element is that
Whitman, when he was writing the poems of
the ﬁrst edition [of Leaves of Grass] seems to have
known little or nothing about Eastern philosophy.
It is more than doubtful that he had even read the
Bhagavad-Gita, one of the few Indian works then
available in translation” (p. 972). (This evidence
includes the absence of any references to Indian
texts in Whitman’s preparatory notebooks, despite
references to many other books.) Rather, as Cowley
suggests, Whitman’s wakefulness seems to have
been completely natural and spontaneous (see
Taylor, 2017, for a fuller discussion on Whitman.)
A similar but lesser known “natural mystic” is
the mid-19th century British nature writer Richard
Jefferies, who almost certainly had no knowledge of
Eastern spiritual traditions or religious mystics. As
the mystical scholar Happold (1986) wrote of him:

Taylor

		He found that “eternal now” of which the
mystics had spoken. He reached a doctrine of the
“nobility of the soul,” which is akin to Eckhart and
Sankara. Though the only idea of God with which
he was acquainted was that of the religion of his
own environment, in his condition of a “deity”
beyond “deity” he tried to express in fumbling
words what Eckhart and Rysbroeck had expressed
so much more adequately in the distinction they
drew between the Godhead and God. (p. 385)
3 I should also mention my personal perspective here.
At the age of around 16, I began to experience
unusual states of being, in which I would be filled
with a powerful sense of inner well-being and
a sense that the world around me was alive and
filled with meaning. I was often awestruck by the
beauty and vividness of things. I felt drawn to
quiet natural spaces, where I felt a powerful sense
of harmony. I felt that I was deeply connected
to the world around me and that there was a
connection between the phenomena around me,
as if they were expressions of a something greater
than themselves. However, at the time, I did not
understand these experiences. My background
was secular, with no religion or spirituality at all.
I only began to understand the experiences when,
at the age of 22, I impulsively bought a book
called Mysticism: A Study and an Anthology by F.C.
Happold (1986), from a local bookshop. The book
had a revelatory effect on me. I saw my experiences
reflected in it. I read passages from The Upanishads
and The Bhagavad-Gita and related strongly to
their descriptions of Brahman pervading the
world, illuminating it and bringing all things into
oneness. I read excerpts from the writings of nontraditional mystics such as Richard Jefferies and
strongly identified with their experiences. So from
this point on I had a framework to make sense of
my experiences.
		 I am therefore a good example of a person
who experienced expansive states of being outside
the context of—and without knowledge of—
spirituality, but who nevertheless had spiritual
experiences, in line with the view that the
psychological landscape of expansive states of
being exists beyond and prior to interpretation by
spiritual traditions. This personal background has
undoubtedly influenced my perspective.

4. Another issue with Friedman’s (2013) argument is
his contention that “transcendent” states cannot
be investigated scientifically because scientific
investigation relies upon a duality between subject
and object. However, to move beyond subject-object
duality does not necessarily mean that the subject
ceases to exist, or ceases to be capable of observation
or knowledge. This confuses individuation with
separation. The subject can still be individuated at
the same time as existing as part of a greater whole,
in the same way that a wave can exist as a form in
its own right at the same time as being one with
the whole ocean. (Meister Eckhart repeatedly stated
that, even in the deepest states of mystical union,
a tiny spark of individuality remained [Kelly &
Grosso, 2007]). The knower and the known do not
have to be separate for knowledge to arise. In fact,
one could say that to participate in the whole as a
subject facilitates a deeper level of knowing, since
it entails more intimate knowledge, authentic gnosis
rather than the superficial intellectual knowledge
that comes from external observation. In reality,
it is only conventional materialistic science that
implies that knowledge depends upon a duality
between object and subject. Moving beyond duality
contravenes that model, but not necessarily science
itself.
		 In addition, the movement beyond duality is
one of the primary and most common principles
of contemplative traditions (Taylor, 2016a), and it
could be argued that the study of such “transdual”
states is one of the primary historical aims of
transpersonal psychology (since transpersonal
literally means “beyond-self”.) And so a field that
excluded the study of such states would hardly merit
the term “transpersonal.”
		 Note that I have used the term “transdual” rather
than “transcendent.” From the perspective of “soft
perennialism” the concept of “the transcendent”
holds little relevance, since spirit is seen as
immanent and all-pervading. Spiritual development
is not seen in terms of transcendence but in terms
of expansion. Expansive ranges of experience are
not transcendent but simply an extension and
intensification of normal awareness. And in fact,
this accords with the perspective of many spiritual
traditions. As Ferrer has put it, “While Friedman’s
portrayal of the transcendent may be consistent
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with certain apophatic mysticisms (Sells, 1994),
it is by no means inclusive of the variety of ways
in which supernatural realities have been enacted,
understood, and described” (2014, p. 158). Although
some traditions speak of a neumonal absolute (for
example, the Ein sof of the Kabbalah, which cannot
be experienced in its pure form, although it emanates
through the material world), this certainly does not
apply to Daoism or the many schools of Tantra, for
example. Most traditions—even Christian mystical
traditions—do accept the possibility of direct
experience of an ultimate referent (Ferrer, 2014).
5. The question of whether Ferrer’s Participatory
Spirituality can be considered a metaphysical
framework is an interesting one. Ferrer has
claimed not, partly because what he has called
“the mystery” is undetermined, which neutralizes
potential metaphysical biases, and also because of
participatory spirituality’s plurality and its emphasis
on “pragmatic values” rather than universal or
objective ones. However, in Taylor (2016a) I
discussed Ferrer’s concept of the “mystery” in relation
to its similarity to the concept of an all-pervading
spiritual force. I concluded that it was impossible to
judge this due to the intentional vagueness of Ferrer’s
depictions. In a similar way, Ferrer’s insistence on
the “undetermined” nature of the mystery could be
construed as a reluctance to, in Marshall’s words,
“bring metaphysics out into the open” (2014, p. 11).
In any case, when Hartelius described participatory
philosophy as suggesting, for example, that
“consciousness in some form penetrates through all
physicality” (Hartelius, 2015, p. 26) it is difficult to
see how, as a metaphysical claim, this differs much
from my description of all-pervading spiritual force.
Other aspects of participatory philosophy’s view of
the world—for example, as a dynamic open-ended
system with no duality between subject and object,
and the human mind and the natural world being of
the same nature (Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013) —could
surely also be construed as metaphysical claims.
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